A full week after Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity of Republika Srpska celebrated its disputed January 9 ‘statehood day’, the fallout has not abated.
While Bosnian Serbs appear to defend the celebration more as a matter of principle and spite than national pride and identity, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats condemn it as unconstitutional and a glorification of Serb war crimes… also for the sake of principle and spite.
Bosnian Croat leader Dragan Covic’s attendance at the official reception organised by Bosnian Serb strongman Milorad Dodik outraged Bosnia as much as Croat-dominated Herzegovina and neighbouring Croatia.¸
The reported presence of Croatia’s ambassador to Bosnia, Ivan Del Vechio, at the same reception triggered yet more condemnation in both countries. Del Vechio admitted being in Banja Luka that day, but denied taking part in the official events.
In the context of the worsening confrontation within and among Bosnia’s three ethno-political blocs, Covic’s participation in Dodik’s RS Day was almost certainly intended as public confirmation that the alliance between their respective parties – the Croat Democratic Union, HDZ, and the Alliance of Independent Social democrats, SNSD – continues.
Covic’s latest visit to Banja Luka also sent an implicit message to Bosniaks – that continued escalation of political conflicts in the country will only bring the Croat and Serb leaders closer together, thus effectively pushing the Bosniaks into the position of a minority partner.
While this move may have strengthened the Covic-Dodik alliance, it has also backfired against Covic.
His presence in Banja Luka on January 9 drew angry reactions from many Croats – from Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Croatia – who saw this as an insult to the memory of the Croats killed in war atrocities carried out by Serb forces in both countries.
Yet it is still uncertain whether this backlash will have any longer-term affect on Covic’s political standing in Bosnia and Croatia. Indeed, Zagreb has been blindly supporting Covic’s politics in recent years, regardless of warnings that such a position was jeopardising relations between the two neighbouring countries as well as the status of Croats in Bosnia.
Zero-sum games block government formation, NATO path
One way or another, this entire episode heralded new political and ethnic divisions and tensions, which are already threatening to halt the implementation of the October general elections and the formation of new governments on different administrative levels.
The SNSD-HDZ alliance and its key role for the next four years had, in a way, already been validated by the results of the October elections.
Despite Bosniaks representing the biggest ethnic group in the country – around or slightly more than half the population – the elections ordained the SNSD and HDZ as political king-makers.
According to the election results, a new state government cannot be established without HDZ and SNSD, while the Federation government cannot be elected without HDZ.
These two parties will be in a position to choose their Bosniak partner/s from several divided and confronted parties representing Bosniak voters, the two main ones being the nationalist Party of Democratic Action, SDA, or a bloc of leftist parties led by the Social Democratic Party, SDP.
Deep political and ideological differences between these Bosniak, Croat and Serb parties were exposed even more in recent weeks and days as the three members of the state presidency and the outgoing state government – the Council of Ministers – battled over the formation of a new state government and the country’s NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).
Both issues became genuinely stuck in the process.
Dodik, the Serb member of the presidency, had earlier called for the quick formation of the new state government, where a Serb should hold the position of prime minister. Dodik has already tapped Republika Srpska former Finance Minister Zoran Tegeltija for the job.
Yet Zeljko Komsic, who beat Covic to the post of Croat member of the presidency thanks to mostly Bosniak voters, insisted he would not agree to the nomination of any prime minister until Bosnia enacts the MAP. His Bosniak counterpart, Sefik Dzaferovic, immediately signed up to the ultimatum.
Serb ministers in the outgoing state government – who support RS policy in insisting on Bosnia’s military neutrality despite the fact they come from opposition parties in RS – refused to even debate, let alone adopt Bosnia’s annual national programme, which is required for the activation of MAP.
The document was finally returned to the Commission for NATO integration for adjustments, but chances are slim that it will ever overcome the strength of Serb objections.
Hence, as some EU diplomats feared, the NATO MAP inadvertently became a destabilising rather than a stabilising factor for the divided country.
Meanwhile, none of the local political leaders seem overly upset at the prospect of Bosnia being managed by the outgoing state government in a technical mandate for the foreseeable future.
Based on Bosnia’s recent political history, one can assume that much of the public ruckus over the formation of new governments as well as the controversial Republika Srpska day is simply the latest choreographed dance between Bosniak, Croat and Serb political parties.
Such a dance creates “a smokescreen upon a smokescreen,” one Western diplomat remarked, thus diverting public attention away from real and pressing issues such as the economy and social and public services.
In for a penny, in for a pound
Republika Srpska’s ‘Statehood Day’ is perhaps one of the best examples of such tactics.
It was celebrated by Bosnian Serb officials for years without much pomp or public attention until SDA leader Bakir Izetbegovic reported it to Bosnia’s Constitutional Court in 2015.
The Court ruled the holiday unconstitutional due to its Orthodox connotations, but that only encouraged Dodik more, mounting a major celebration on January 9, 2016. He then raised the stakes even more by calling a referendum on the issue, which was held – again against a court ruling – in September 2016, conveniently just days ahead of local elections.
Still, in October that year, the Republika Srpska National Assembly adopted a new text of the disputed law on public holidays, removing the religious connotations. Nevertheless, Bosniak parties and experts still consider the law unconstitutional, although the Court is yet to rule.
‘Smoke screens’ and similar tactics employed by Bosnia’s political parties have been steadily undermining the country’s constitutional, administrative and political system.
While Bosniak leaders have strongly complained against Dodik’s violations of the state constitution, they – as well as other Bosnian Croat and Serb parties – have themselves been increasingly ignoring or openly violating parts of the state, entity and cantonal constitutions, laws and bylaws.
To make the situation worse, and add to Bosnia’s general sense of demise, local politicians seem to have spread the virus of populism, spite and zero-sum games to the broader local communities. Or the virus was there from the beginning.
As a result, a greater and greater share of the general public – including social networks, media, activists and academics – in recent years joined the fracas, often even outdoing politicians in their hardline positions and radical rhetoric.
Hence, the country’s political crisis has gradually exacerbated divisions within society and evolved into a crisis of common national identity.
In this context, Covic’s presence at an event which – whether constitutional or not – is traditionally shunned by all international and local non-Serb officials, had an additional and much deeper meaning; Covic essentially sent a message to Bosniak leaders and the Bosniak public that continued political confrontation will continue to pitch the Croat and Serb leaders against their common political adversaries – the Bosniaks.
This is a harsh but important message and Bosniaks, as well as the international community, should take heed, whether they like and/or agree with the message or not.
The almost complete politicisation and ethnicisation of Bosnian society – and the disappearance of a true civic political option 23 years after the end of the 1992-95 war – means that Bosnia and Herzegovina will, at least in the near future, continue to be managed by nationalist parties and leaders.
While Covic and Dodik in recent years proved difficult, often ruthless and overly provocative political opponents, it is now clear that they remain the undisputed representatives of their ethnic groups, and thus their positions cannot be ignored.
In such a situation, the future of the country will be determined by Bosniaks and the capacity and willingness of their political and religious leaders to find a way to make a workable deal with the current and future Dodiks and Covics. Or they will continue to engage in petty, zero-sum games that will inevitably lead to the further disintegration of Bosnian society.
The Balkaninsight
